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DETERMINANTS OF LOCAL POLICE PROTECTION EXPENDITURES:
A PANEL STUDY OF LARGE CITY GOVERNMENTS

Zac Carter

Since the 1980’s, justice system expenditures in the United States have increased nearly
300%, adjusting for inflation. And though rates of violent and property crimes have decreased
by close to 50% since the 1990’s, total arrests have fallen by only 20% in the same period. The
relationship between crime and police expenditures has yet to be answered to a definitive degree.
This paper attempts to identify the social and economic factors that drive the changes in percapita police spending of 140 large city governments in the United States, for the eight year
period of 2005 to 2012. A fixed-effects panel model of per-capita police expenditures is
developed using two-stage least-squares estimation. These findings suggest that local police
expenditures may respond to local budgetary capacities and past spending to a greater degree
than rates of violent crime and other social or demographic factors.
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“Fear follows crime, and is its punishment”
- Voltaire
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I.

Introduction
The U.S. spent a record $185 billion on police protection, corrections, and judicial and

legal activities in 2003, a 418% unadjusted increase over 1982 expenditure levels. Adjusting for
inflation, these expenditures almost tripled (U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2006). Local
governments (city and county) funded 50% of the expenditure, while states funded 33%,
meaning that state and local governments spent four times more on the justice system than on
education, and two times more than on public welfare that year. 45% of the total justice system
spending went towards funding police protection, while corrections and detention accounted for
roughly 33% (BJS, 2006).
Policing has traditionally been a locally funded function, but local governments funded
just 69% of total police protection expenditures in 2003, with much of the remaining funding
coming from federal law enforcement grants (BJS, 2006). Much of the increase in U.S. justice
system spending in recent decades has been attributed to these federal law enforcement grant
programs, which became popular in the 1980’s and 90’s, aimed at deterring increased criminal
activity. Since 1994, the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS), a component
of the U.S. Department of Justice, has invested over $14 billion to help advance community
policing.
The rapid expansion of police funding in recent years has sparked controversy among
local constituents, and many would argue that such increases in police expenditures are
unjustified. This argument would point out that rates of violent crimes and property crimes have
fallen nearly 50% since 1991 (Justice Police Institute, 2012). Additionally, though violent and
property offenses have fallen significantly, total arrests have decreased by only 20%, and arrests
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for non-violent drug offenses have increased nearly 50% between 1993 and 2010,
disproportionately affecting low-income communities of color. (JPI, 2012). When crime rates
were especially high in the 80’s and early 90’s, the response of local governments increasing
allocations to local police departments seemed justified. Today, however, with crime rates near
their lowest levels in decades, we continue to see high levels of police expenditures, though a
shift in focus among police departments seems to have taken place. If policing resources are
employed as a result, or in response to criminal activities, one would expect such expenditures to
have declined in recent years, as the need for these resources is lessened.
Local justice systems are comprised of three main areas: police protection, judicial/legal,
and corrections/detention. This work focuses on identifying determinants of one area of city
justice expenditures in particular – police protection. Specifically, this analysis focuses on the
determinants of per-capita police protection expenditures of large-city governments, for the
eight-year period of 2005-2012. Police protection is defined as “preservation of law and order
and traffic safety; includes police patrols and communications, crime prevention activities,
detention and custody of persons awaiting trial, traffic safety, vehicular inspection, and the like.”
(U.S. Census, 1992).
In addition to analyzing the sample as a whole, the sample is divided into two population
strata (low and high) to examine potential differences in police expenditure determinants, as
there is an expectation that cities of varying populations may respond differently to their local
environments. Identifying the characteristics and local conditions that explain how expenditures
are affected within a city is not only useful for the purpose of efficiently allocating future
revenues to better serve the needs of the community, but this paper is also a necessary addition to
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public finance literature. Few studies in recent years have focused specifically on identifying
factors affecting police expenditures while using more recent and robust data.
So far, the discussion has focused on aggregate levels of U.S. justice system spending in
order to show just how much the justice system has expanded in the last 20-30 years. However,
this analysis emphasizes city-level expenditures, as opposed to national expenditures. Variations
in city size, population, and other socio-economic factors are expected. Moreover, we would
assume that a city’s spending habits would reflect those differences. People and governments
respond to changes within their communities. Preferences for particular public services can be
revealed directly to local representatives by democratic processes, social movements, or
indirectly based on the immediate needs of the city. Whatever the case, governments are
responding.
Local governments, much like state and federal governments, draw funds from a common
tax base, and allocate revenues based on a community’s preferences for public goods. While
some revenues are restricted for certain uses by law, others are subject to the decisions of local
representatives based on the needs of the community. The “general fund” is used to account for
“money that is not required legally or by sound financial management to be accounted for in
another fund” (Census). Policing expenses fall under this category. While the primary source of
city revenues are local property taxes, others include sales and use taxes, business license taxes,
hotel taxes, and utility use taxes. State and federal revenues can find their way back into local
community’s budgets through intergovernmental revenues and grants.
The sample used in this analysis includes only large cities, with populations greater than
150K in the beginning year period of 2005. Beaton (1974) argued that using too broad of a
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range of population sizes may pose problems with estimation, and may lead to incorrect
statistical inferences. Furthermore, he argues that small cities – compared to larger cities – are
entirely different environments, and that the degree of political activity on the part of local
constituents changes greatly with city size (Beaton, 1974). Thus, a separate analysis is
conducted by separating the sample into different population strata to examine any differences in
determinants of police spending, though the model specifications for each subgroup remains the
same.
Findings indicate that police departments, in recent years, haven’t responded to rates of
violent crime to the degree that they have responded to other community characteristics and
fiscal capacities. This is one interpretation of the results presented here, and while it is possible
that police don’t respond directly to violent crime to the same extent as they have in the past,
they may be responding to other types of crime, or community pressures instead. These findings
suggest that policing in the U.S may have undergone significant changes in the last few decades.
The remainder of this paper is ordered as follows: literature review, data, methodology,
hypotheses, results, and a final conclusion.

II.

Literature Review
Using data on the 43 largest U.S. cities in 1970, McPheters and Stronge (1974) attempted

to identify determinants of police force expenditures, and argued that a definitive relationship
between crime rates and police expenditures has yet to be shown. They argue that while
economic theory would suggest a negative relationship between police expenditures and crime
rates (more police spending leads to less crime), results of some studies have shown the
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relationship to be positive (Pressman and Carol, 1971). A simultaneous model of both crime and
police force expenditures was used in the analysis. Other independent variables included
population density, unemployment rates, percent change in the black population, percent of
families on welfare, and percent aged 15-24, to name a few.
McPheters and Stronge (1974) find that police expenditures are significantly and
positively related to crime rates and local budgetary constraints (McPheters and Stronge, 1974).
In the police expenditure equation, crime rates and city revenue are shown to exert a strong
positive influence on the level of police expenditures, yet in the crime equation, the effect of
police expenditures on crime rates is smaller, indicating that law enforcement expenditures,
historically, have responded to crime to a greater degree than they have deterred criminal
activity. The findings of McPheters and Stronge (1974) seem to be at odds with what we have
seen in recent decades, with police expenditures continuing to rise, despite having some of the
lowest rates of violent/property crimes in decades. Perhaps the nature of this relationship has
flipped since the 1970’s, meaning that increased expenditures have been more effective in
deterring crimes than they have been in decades past.
Worrall and Kovandzic (2010) attempted to identify the relationship between police and
crime rates in 5100 U.S. cities using annual data from 1990 to 2001, with crime rates as their
dependent variable. Recognizing the issue of endogeneity between crime rates and police levels,
they opted for an instrumental variable approach in their analysis and instrumented police levels
with both federal law enforcement grants and a measure of police hiring. A series of fixedeffects instrumental variable models were generated using GMM (generalized method of
moments), which, they argue, has become increasingly popular in recent years among
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researchers trying to address the issue of endogeneity and instrument validity (Worrall and
Kovandzic, 2010).
The results of Worrall and Kovandzic (2010) indicated that there was a modest inverse
relationship between crime and police levels (as police levels increase, crime decreases).
Furthermore, they claim that the effects were more concentrated in cities with larger populations.
Also among their explanatory variables; percent non-white, was found to be negatively
associated with 6 of 7 crime categories, a result inconsistent with other recent studies (Krivo,
2009). This effect was argued to be a symptom of panel data, and that “racial composition,
particularly at the city level, is both invariant and slow-moving, leading to possible collinearity
with unit dummy variables”, which could be a potential reason for the sign changes on the
coefficients (Worrall and Kovandzic, 2010).
Using local level data from 1960-70, Beaton (1974) tested whether different size cities
produce different results with regards to police expenditures, stating a few reasons for his
motivation: 1) Using broad population ranges in the analysis may produce heteroskedastic
residuals 2.) The level of political activity of local citizens changes with city size, and 3.) Cities
declining in population have different policing requirements than those growing in population.
Cities were separated into different strata based on population size, and analyzed separately,
including explanatory factors such as population density, growth rate, age demographics, and
some industry-specific employment variables. In general, the results showed that for cities
growing in population, population was the most significant variable in affecting per-capita police
expenditures. For cities declining in population, population density was shown to be most
significant (Beaton, 1974).
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Using a sample of 79 cities and 1973 data, Bahl et al. (1978) employed a structural
equation approach to their analysis, and sought to answer the question of “how do variations in
community characteristics and local government fiscal capacity act to affect expenditures
through their effects on employment and compensations” (Bahl et al., 1978). Three equations
were estimated: compensation, employment, and crime. Two-stage least squares is used in
estimating each equation. Traditional cross-section expenditure models, they argue, are limited
in their ability to explain public sector behavior, and their results suggest that important variables
have been excluded from previous analyses (Bahl et al., 1978). Among the three equations, they
opted to include the manufacturing wage, degree of unionization, price of private goods, and the
average length of prison sentence served. In conclusion, the results of the analysis, with respect
to police employment, show that police employment responds positively with crime, population,
income, and the nonwhite population, and negatively with education. They concluded that police
employment varies among cities “not only because of variations in the need for services but
because of variations in the cost of providing any given level of services” (Bahl et al., 1978).
Chamlin (1990) examined macro social determinants of police expenditures in Chicago,
using 1904-1958 data. Included in the set of explanatory variables are city revenues, percent
black, unemployment rates, and arrest rates. “The Thompson Administration” – referring to
Chicago Mayor William Hale, or “Big Bill” Thompson, who, during his mayoral term,
reportedly maintained strong ties to organized crime, and even appointed one of Al Capone’s
lieutenants to Inspector of Weights and Measure – is also included in the model to account for
the potential influence that Thompson’s criminal ties could have on the amount of policing
resources employed to combat crime (Chamlin, 1990).
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The results of Chamlin (1990) suggest that city revenues and percent black have a
dominant influence in affecting police expenditures, with a 1% increase in percent black
corresponding to a $16,500 increase in police expenditures. Also, police funding was found to
decline substantially during the years of Mayor William Thompson. A more surprising result,
according to Chamlin (1990), is that the previous year’s police expenditure didn’t seem to have
any significant influence on the next period’s expenditures. The findings indicate that
“budgetary decision-makers respond more to the local environment than previous research
implies” (Chamlin, 1990).
Jackson and Carroll (1981) emphasized the role of racial composition, civil rights
mobilization activity, and number of riots in the 1960’s to help explain variations in municipal
police expenditures in 90 non-southern U.S. cities. They suggest that previous studies typically
ignore these factors in their analyses. In addition to these factors, their model specification
hypothesizes that police service expenditures respond to population size and density, the
percentage of the population below the poverty level, the ratio of black to white median income
as a measure of racial inequality, total city revenue, and the local crime rate. Among the
statistically significant variables in the linear expenditure model are total city revenues, percent
black, population, population density, civil rights mobilization activity, and percent below the
poverty line. Population, percent black, population density, city revenue, and civil rights
mobilization activity were shown to be positively related to police expenditures, while poverty
and police expenditure were shown to be negative in relation. Neither the number of riots nor
the crime rate was not found to be a significant factor affecting policing expenditures. The
results (2SLS), as they suggest, “lead us to argue that police expenditures are a resource that is
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mobilized or expanded when a minority group appears threatening to the dominant group”
(Jackson and Carroll, 1981).

III.

Data
Police protection expenditure data as well measures of local revenue are drawn from the

Census Bureau’s Annual Survey of State and Local Governments. The Census survey defines
police protection expenditures as expenditures relating to the “preservation of law and order and
traffic safety. Includes police patrols and communications, crime prevention activities, detention
and custody of persons awaiting trial, traffic safety, vehicular inspection, and the like.” All
revenue and expenditure data are measured in thousands of 2012 dollars, excluding per-capita
expenditures, which is measured in dollars.
Violent crime data for local police departments are drawn from the FBI’s Uniform Crime
Reports (UCR) and are measured as “rate per 100K inhabitants”. The aggregate rate of violent
crime includes four sub-categories of violent crime; forcible rape, aggravated assault, robbery,
and murder and non-negligent manslaughter.
Employment data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Local Area Unemployment
page include level-variables like total labor force, employment, and unemployment.
Unemployment rates are measured as percentage of the labor force unemployed. The Bureau of
Labor Statistics defines unemployed as “persons aged 16 years and older who had no
employment during the reference week, were available for work, except for temporary illness,
and had made specific efforts to find employment sometime during the 4-week period ending
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with the reference week. Persons who were waiting to be recalled to a job from which they had
been laid off need not have been looking for work to be classified as unemployed.”
Measures of income, poverty, age, gender and race are drawn from the American
Community Survey (ACS). Specific measures of income mean and median household income,
as well as the mean-to-median household income ratio, which is included as a measure of income
inequality. Percent living in poverty is measured as percent of the local population living below
the poverty threshold, which varies by different household criteria. Age, gender, and race
variables include levels as well as percentages of the local population. All data are annual, or
single-year estimates. Income measures have also been inflation-adjusted to 2012 dollars.
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Table 3.1 - Summary Statistics, all years

Variable

N

Mean

Std. Dev

Minimum

Maximum

Population

1119

455,984.76

781,808.81

139,158

8,391,881

Poverty Rate

1120

18.6

6.7

3.1

42.6

Unemployment Rate

1118

7.4

3.2

1.8

25.1

Violent Crime Rate

1110

759.69

421.36

50.6

2,480.70

Percent Non-white

1119

35.14

16.76

3.86

88.69

Percent Male

1120

48.96

1.43

45.3

53.9

Percent Age 15-24

1120

15.44

3.10

8.7

37.5

Mean/Median Household
Income Ratio

1120

1.372

0.123

1

1.853

Median Income

1120

$

50,302.37 $

13,844.15 $

General Revenue

1120

$1,611,602.34 $7,080,394.26 $ 138,732.08 $86,142,824.29

Police Protection
Expenditure

1120

$ 166,682.88 $ 429,551.15 $

Police Protection
Expenditure Per Capita

1119

$

314.66 $

123.19 $

23,600.00 $

109,538.60

14,123.88 $ 5,065,889.00

85.90 $

1,064.67

Note: Table includes pooled data from all years (2005-2012). All revenue, tax, and expenditure data are
inflation adjusted and measured in thousands of dollars, excluding per-capita police expenditures, which
are measured in dollars. Sample includes 140 U.S. cities.
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Table 3.2 - Summary Statistics, 2005

Variable

N

Mean

Std Dev

Minimum

Maximum

Population

140

430,902.95

755,182.67

139,158

7,956,113

Poverty Rate

140

17.4

6.6

4.1

42.6

Unemployment Rate

139

5.3

1.5

2.3

13.5

Violent Crime Rate

138

825.02

449.69

84.1

2,405.50

Percent Non-white

140

36.16

16.98

4.69

87.38

Percent Male

140

48.82

1.48

45.3

52.2

Percent Age 15-24

140

14.43

2.29

9

26.5

Mean/Median Household
Income Ratio

140

1.355

0.122

1

1.741

Median Income

140

$

50,776.62 $

13,729.60 $

General Revenue

140

$1,543,176.18 $6,753,422.61 $ 138,732.08 $79,127,298.89

Police Protection
Expenditure

140

$ 160,436.30 $ 427,133.28 $

Police Protection
Expenditure Per Capita

140

$

309.88 $

125.63 $

28,337.30 $

97,369.40

14,349.08 $ 4,654,326.54

85.90 $

995.06
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Table 3.3 - Summary Statistics, 2012

Variable

N

Mean

Std Dev

Minimum

Maximum

Population

140

471,008.12

794,442.25

151,019

8,336,697

Poverty Rate

140

20.7

6.8

4.4

42.3

Unemployment Rate

140

8.5

2.5

3.5

19.2

Violent Crime Rate

139

685.44

399.60

50.6

2,122.90

Percent Non-white

140

34.95

16.70

5.25

85.41

Percent Male

140

48.88

1.18

45.7

52.1

Percent Age 15-24

140

15.68

3.20

10.5

33.4

Mean/Median Household
Income Ratio

140

1.388

0.125

1

1.776

Median Income

140

$

47,670.94 $

13,407.18 $

General Revenue

140

$1,621,144.41 $7,259,536.69 $ 143,326.00 $85,077,983.00

Police Protection
Expenditure

140

$ 168,115.71 $ 451,640.60 $

Police Protection
Expenditure Per Capita

140

$

305.08 $

118.50 $

23,600.00 $

100,574.00

18,878.00 $ 5,065,889.00

105.46 $

891.57
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174.66

173.73
168.12

166.64
169.7
160.97

160.44

2005

159.2

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

Figure 3.1

323.18

324.23

316.3

313.32
309.88

317.64

307.73
305.08

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

Figure 3.2

2010

2011

2012
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832.8

848.5

838.9
799.2

688.6
740.2
704.1

679.1

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

Figure 3.3

The summary statistics found in Tables 3.1 - 3.3 provide insight into the data used in the
analysis. The average population in the sample from Table 3.3 is roughly 450K. It should be
noted that many of these variables have standard deviations higher than their means. This is due
to the “mega-cities” like New York and L.A. in the sample that inflate many of the average
values, as well as their standard deviations. Due to this, many of these variables are logged in
the analysis in attempt to normalize their distributions. Tables 3.2 and 3.3 serve to show how the
means of the variables have changed, from 2005 to 2012. Though we can’t discern the path the
data followed between 2005 and 2012, we can gain a general look at the beginning and ending
years of the sample. For instance, since 2005, unemployment rates, poverty rates, general
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revenue, and total police expenditures have increased. However, median income, violent crime,
and police expenditures per-capita have all decreased since 2005.
In Figures 3.1 and 3.2, we can see a surprising decline in both per-capita and total police
expenditures starting in 2010. This could be due to a number of reasons, but a likely possibility
is that these declines were brought about as a result of the 2007-09 financial crisis. Many cities
were hit with substantial revenue losses during this time, and cuts to different areas of public
services wouldn’t be unexpected. We can also see from Figure 3.3 a fairly steady decline in
rates of violent crime throughout the sample period. A comparison of Figures 3.1 and 3.3 show a
“mirrored” relationship, in which rates of violent crime fall as total police expenditures rise.
Whether or not the decrease in crime was brought about by the rise in police spending isn’t a
central question to this analysis, but previous research has shown the existence of minor to
moderate deterrent effects (McPheters and Stronge, 1974, Worrall and Kovandzic, 2010).

IV.

Methodology
The empirical model for this analysis will largely follow the work of McPheters and

Stronge (1974), Worrall and Kovandzic (2010), and Beaton (1974). This work employs a twostage least-squares panel model approach (fixed effects), using the predicted violent crime-rate
values from the first-stage as the instrumental variable in the second stage (police expenditures).
This methodology will address the endogeneity problem of the model by attempting to remove
the correlation between the endogenous variable (crime) and the error term in the police
expenditure equation. Such estimation will result in consistent estimators.
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Under fixed-effects estimation, unique intercepts for each cross-section and time-series
are estimated, which allows for the examination of city/time-specific unobserved effects in each
model. This method was chosen due to the nature of the models being estimated. Participating
in a crime is a behavior, and such behaviors are inherently difficult to predict within the context
of linear regression models, and the decision to participate in such crimes is likely one that is
subject to factors beyond what is controlled for in the models presented. We would expect
human psychology, attitudes, and risk perceptions to come into play when explaining criminal
behavior (Ehrlich, 1973), but these variables are difficult to measure, and are more often than
not, unavailable for use in studies such as this.
The same can be assumed in the police expenditure equation. There are likely
characteristics of cities that are unobserved, either due to their difficulty of measurement or
unavailability of the data itself. Fixed-effects estimation attempts to control for such omitted
factors. The unique intercept allows for city specific “fixed-effects”, in which the unobserved
factors are theoretically represented. The same equations are also applied to both population
strata sub-groups – those with populations less than 400K in year 2005, and those with greater
than 400K in year 2005. The equations of violent crime and per-capita police expenditures are
as follows:
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Stage 1.


ln(CRIME(IV)) = {ln(POLICE EXPENDITUREt-1), INEQUALITY,
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE , PERCENT NONWHITE, PERCENT AGE 15-24,
PERCENT MALE, PERCENT POVERTY, ln(POPULATION)}

Stage 2.


ln(POLICE EXPENDITURE) = {ln(POLICE EXPENDITUREt-1), ln(CRIME(IV)),
ln(REVENUE), PERCENT NONWHITE, ln(POPULATION)}

In Stage1, the dependent variable is the log of the violent crime rate, and is a function of
the log of the previous year’s per-capita police expenditures, the mean-to-median household
income ratio (inequality), the unemployment rate, percent nonwhite, percent ages 15-24, percent
male, percent in poverty, and the log of the population. The predicted values from the crime
equation (Stage 1) are then substituted into the police expenditure equation (Stage 2).
In Stage 2, the dependent variable is the log of local police expenditures per-capita, and is
a function of the logged value of the previous year’s police spending per-capita, the predicted
crime-rate values from Stage 1, the log of city’s general revenue, percent non-white, and the log
of the local population. Lagged measures of expenditure are included in each equation since
current police spending and crime rates assumptively follow a slower process in responding to
changes from previous periods.
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V.

Hypotheses

Violent Crime
Theory suggests that increases in violent criminal activity within a locality leads to
increased outlays for police protection, and research regarding crime rates and police
expenditures generally finds this to be true (McPheters and Stronge, 1974, and Worrall and
Kovandzic, 2010), albeit with a few exceptions (Pressman and Carol, 1971). Thus, a positive
relationship is to be expected between per-capita police protection expenditures and violent
crime-rates (as crime goes up, police expenditures increase). For example, Baltimore – a city
with exceedingly high rates of violent crime (roughly twice the average in the sample) - spent
371 million dollars on police protection in 2012, with the sample average being roughly 160
million (Annual Survey of State and Local Governments, 2012).
Conversely, we would expect increased police expenditure to have a deterrent effect on
crime rates. That is, increases in police expenditures reduce crime. This effect could be argued
in both directions, however, as increased police presence may result in increased reported crime
by local police departments. It is difficult to capture the true crime rate in this sense, as many
crimes go undetected by police, or unreported by civilians. Thus, increases in violent crime are
expected to exert positive influence on police expenditures, while increases in police
expenditures are expected to exert negative influence on rates of violent crime.
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Previous year’s police expenditures
Adjusting for inflation, the dollar amount of revenue sources devoted to policing
expenses in the previous period is expected to have a positive relationship with the current level
of police protection spending. Assuming the previous period’s budget was put to use in its full
extent, this might imply to budgetary decision makers that the need for at least that level of funds
is “justified” in the next period, even though there may not be an actual need for such funds
within the police department. The assumption that police departments will use all or most of the
funds available to them seems fairly reasonable, as there may be a moral hazard for police
departments to hurry and use their available funds before the end of the fiscal year, regardless of
whether or not those funds would provide some kind of benefit to the community. Using data on
procurement spending of the U.S. Federal Government, Liebman and Mahoney (2010) found
that end of the year spending is 4.9 times higher than the year average, and that large majority of
these funds went towards lower quality projects. Many times, last minute spending may reflect
an organization’s fear of receiving lesser revenue allocations in successive periods. In either
case, they would likely lobby for at least the previous period’s level of funding to accomplish
necessary policing activities, hence the expectation of a positive relationship with current
expenditures.

Revenue
Increases in the amount of available funding for local public functions is expected to have
a positive impact on the amount of funding allocated towards police protection. As a city’s
budgetary constraint is lessened, more funds are available to be allocated where they are needed.

26
It would make sense in this case to expect a positive relationship. That is, a city’s spending on
police should not be reduced if more funds are available. Rather, there is increased potential for
more funds to be allocated towards policing measures should there be an immediate need for
such services, if the level of available funding grows. Thus, since the amount of police
protection expenditures is a direct function of the amount of revenue available to the city, it is a
relevant factor in explaining variations in police spending.

Income, Poverty & Unemployment
Economic well-being, or lack thereof, is thought to be a primary contributor of social
unrest and/or crime in large municipalities. With lower incomes, and fewer opportunities in the
job market, individuals are more likely to substitute away from legal activities toward illegal
ones (Ehrlich, 1973). This reality is illustrated by low-income, inner-city neighborhoods with
high levels of unemployment. Measures of income, poverty and unemployment are expected to
affect levels of police expenditures indirectly, as they are likely to affect rates of crime first and
foremost, hence why these variables appear in the crime equation but are exempt from the police
expenditure equation. It is expected that poverty (% below poverty line), and unemployment
rates (% unemployed) are positively related to rates of violent crime. As for the mean-to-median
income ratio, the measure of income inequality in the first stage equation, it is expected that
increases in this ratio will lead to increases in the estimated crime rate. Increases in this ratio
would suggest that the top earners’ average wages have increased, or that median household
income has decreased. In either case, income inequality is greater, and likely effects crime rates
positively.
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Though one may argue that increasing income inequality is likely to have more of an
effect on property crimes as opposed to violent crimes, a positive relationship may still exist
between inequality and violent crime, as increased desperation among a city’s poorest residents
could lead to higher frequencies of certain types of violent offenses like aggravated assaults or
robberies. Indeed, throughout the sample, cities with the greatest degree of income inequality
(Atlanta, Miami, New Orleans) tend to see higher rates of violent crime (1,675 per 100K, Atlanta
2006), relative to the average crime rate in the sample (760 per 100K inhabitants). Whether this
is a causal relationship or a mere correlation is unknown, but increased inequality is expected to
exert a positive influence on crime rates in the model.

Race, Age, Gender Demographics
Demographic factors such as age and race distributions also play an important role in the
police expenditure literature (Beaton, 1974, Worrall and Kovandzic, 2010, McPheters and
Stronge, 1974). Cities with higher concentrations of young, minority groups tend to see higher
rates of crime. While this theory is confirmed in much of the related crime and police literature,
McPheters and Stronge (1974) found insignificant effects of minority presence on crime, after
other factors like urban decay are accounted for. It is expected, however, that the measure of
minority presence (percent black or percent non-white) would exert a positive influence on the
crime-rate and level of police expenditures.
Typically, minority groups are faced with lower incomes as well as higher rates of
unemployment, especially in large cities. A recent 2016 report presented by the Chicago Urban
League reported that almost half of Chicago’s young black men between the ages of 20-24 are
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neither employed nor in school. Nationally, 32% of young black males are unemployed,
according to the report. Such high rates of unemployment, accompanied by low household
incomes among these groups is seen as a driving force for crime (Ehrlich, 1973), and it is
expected that the results will show a positive influence in both the crime, and police expenditure
equation. That is, it is hypothesized that police expenditures increase with minority presence
directly, regardless of whether or not these groups are committing crimes at disproportionate
rates. Thus, a measure of minority presence is included in both equations. Regarding gender,
having larger populations of males is expected to exert a positive influence on crime, since males
commit violent crimes at a far higher rate than females. 83% of total crime in year 2000 was
committed by males (Krienart, 2003).

VI.

Results
It should be noted that a number of the variables discussed above appear only in the first-

stage crime equation. For example, income and gender/age demographics were only included in
the crime model as it is the assumption that these variables affect crime to a greater degree than
police expenditures. Also, while we won’t draw any conclusions from the first-stage results,
since the sole purpose of the first stage is to create the instrument for crime, the results of Stage 1
are listed in Table 6.1.
The results of the Stage 2 fixed-effects models are shown in Table 6.2. All three
population categories are present in the table. The table includes the panel model details,
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including number of cross-sections and time-series lengths. In the lower portion of the table,
coefficient estimates are displayed as well as the estimate’s standard error in parentheses.

Table 6.1 – Stage 1. Results, Coefficient Estimates

Stage 1. Coefficient Estimates: Two way Fixed Effects
Full Sample

Pop < 400K

Pop > 400K

Cross Sections

140

100

40

Time Series Length

8

8

8

R-Squared

0.9705

0.9694

0.9711

Variable
Intercept
Police Expend. Per Cap (t-1)
Mean/Median Income Ratio
Poverty Rate
Unemployment Rate
Log (Population)
Percent Nonwhite
Percent Male
Percent Age 15-24

Coefficient Estimates & (SE's)
9.747***
7.575***
14.75***
(1.257)
(1.6207)
(2.377)
-0.0514
-0.073
-0.0946
(0.0401)
(0.0514)
(0.068)
-0.0361
-0.00126
-0.0654
(0.0864)
(0.1024)
(0.18)
0.005**
0.00855***
-0.0067
(0.0022)
(0.00264)
(0.00454)
-0.0042
-0.00121
-0.0076
(0.0035)
(0.00456)
(0.0056)
-0.3058***
-0.1344
-0.5285***
(0.0958)
(0.126)
(0.1604)
0.00261**
0.00349***
0.00014
(0.0011)
(0.0013)
(0.0022)
0.0054
0.0065
0.00915
(0.0049)
(0.0055)
(0.0122)
0.00027
-0.00141
-0.0078
(0.0035)
(0.00425)
(0.1604)

Year Dummies

Yes

Yes

Yes

City Dummies

Yes

Yes

Yes

Significant coefficient estimates are denoted with asterisks, with significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels denoted “***”, “**”, and “*”, respectively.
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Table 6.2 – Stage 2. Results, Coefficient Estimates

Stage 2. Coefficient Estimates: Two way Fixed Effects
Full Sample

Pop < 400K

Pop > 400K

Cross Sections

140

100

40

Time Series Length

8

8

8

R-Squared

0.94

0.927

0.953

Variable

Coefficient Estimates & (SE's)
11.282***
(3.398)
-0.1157
(0.32)
0.242***
(0.0372)
0.2111***
(0.0372)
-0.728***
(0.1248)
0.0002
(0.00124)

10.437***
(2.409)
0.141
(0.2361)
0.2158***
(0.045)
0.1744***
(0.0462)
-0.7277***
(0.104)
-0.0008
(0.0013)

0.366
(4.339)
0.4695
(0.304)
0.3909***
(0.0675)
0.2449***
(0.0689)
-0.261
(0.1982)
0.0000061
(0.002)

Year Dummies

Yes

Yes

Yes

City Dummies

Yes

Yes

Yes

Intercept
Violent Crime (IV)
Police Expend. Per Cap (t-1)
Log (General Revenue)
Log (Population)
Percent Nonwhite

Significant coefficient estimates are denoted with asterisks, with significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels denoted “***”, “**”, and “*”, respectively.

General revenue, population, and the previous year’s police spending are all significantly
related to the current year’s expenditures, across all three models, excluding population in the
“mega-city” sample. A more surprising result is that the effect of violent crime on police
spending is entirely insignificant across all three models, and shows no major contribution to
explaining variations in police expenditures. This result is in contrast to McPheters and Stronge

31
(1974), in which total crime was shown to have a positive impact on police expenditures. The
measure of total crime used in their analysis included property crimes as well, which this study
has ignored. This could be a potential reason for violent crime’s insignificance in this model, as
property crimes occur at much higher frequencies than do violent crimes (UCR). The inclusion
of property crimes in addition to violent crimes in this model may produce different results.
Lastly, the lack of a substantial relationship regarding the effect of crime on police
expenditures does tell us something, however. We can reasonably infer from these findings that
there may be a large deterrent effect occurring, where crime responds dramatically to police
expenditures, but not vice versa. However, a separate analysis would need to be conducted to
assess the validity of such statements.
The coefficient regarding the previous year’s level of police spending is positive in
relation to the current year’s spending, across all three models. Since both the response and
independent variables are logged in this case, we can interpret these coefficients as elasticities.
The coefficient value of .242 indicates that a 10% increase in the previous year’s police spending
per-capita results in an increase of 2.42%, according to the model. This would mean that a 10%
increase in past police spending results in an increase of about $8 per person, on average. Thus,
the typical city - i.e. Atlanta, or Sacramento - would experience an increase of over $3.5 million
in total police expenditure. A similar result is found in the sample including cities with less than
400K populations, and a much larger effect in the “mega-city” sample. These results are in
contrast to the results of Chamlin (1990), in which no significant relationship was found between
past spending and current spending. The larger effect in the mega-city sample may tell us
something about the nature of large city governments and how budgetary decisions are made
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regarding police expenditures. There may exist considerably higher levels of influence on the
part of police departments in lobbying for higher levels of revenue allocations, given that the
previous year’s allocation was put to use in its full extent.
General revenue was also found to have a statistically significant and positive impact on
police expenditures. Since this term is also logged in the model, the interpretation of this
coefficient is also an elasticity. According to the model, a 10% increase in local general revenue
results in a 2.11% increase in police expenditures. This translates to an average increase of about
$7 per-person, or $3.2 million in total police expenditures, which is fairly substantial when
considering a modest 10% increase in yearly revenues. If such a trend were to continue over the
years, the growth in police expenditures becomes even more apparent. This result was expected,
since the expansion of a local government’s ability to provide increased allocations of revenue to
various entities providing public services would likely result in more revenue allocations given
to them, assuming that the performance of such entities has been sufficient, and there is no
reason to cut funding, or allocate the additional funds elsewhere instead. This result is in
accordance with the results of McPheters and Stronge (1974), in which city revenues were one of
the primary factors in explaining variations in police expenditures.
Lastly, population is significant and negative in relation to per-capita police expenditures
in two of the three models. This result is quite interesting, as one might expect to see a positive
relationship between the two. However, this finding suggests that as the local population
increases, the amount of policing expenditures per person declines, all else constant. The
coefficient value of -.728 in the full sample model suggests that a 10% increase in the local
population results in a 7.28% decrease in per-capita police expenditures. This result may point
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to the difficulty of scaling such expenditures with population growth at a constant rate, as the
amount of revenue collected each year likely grows at a slower pace than the rate of population
growth. It is important to note once more that the primary source of revenues for local
governments are property taxes, and a higher population doesn’t necessarily mean higher
property tax revenues, since certain occupancies may have a larger number of individuals
residing there. If a measure of the number of tax-paying residencies in the city were included as
an explanatory factor in the model, we may then see a positive relationship with police
expenditures. However, the effect of such a variable is likely already captured by the measure of
general revenue in the model, and may cause issues with collinearity. For these reasons, no such
variable is included in the analysis.

VII.

Conclusion
This paper has focused on identifying the socio-economic determinants that affect levels

of per-capita police spending in large U.S. cities. While there is a considerable body of literature
regarding city-level expenditures in general, the analyses of specific government functions are
more limited with regard to police expenditures. This paper serves to expand on previous works
by incorporating more recent data within a panel structure, and aims to provide insight as to why
certain public functions are funded to the degree that we see. The findings of this study point to
existence of inertia in the funding for police expenditures. That is, even with rates of violent and
property crimes at some of their lowest levels in decades – which may have been accomplished
by the increased levels of expenditures since the 1980’s – local governments have failed to scale
back revenue allocations to police departments, and a general shift in focus among police
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departments seems to have taken place. Instead of employing more resources in response to
violent crimes, a possible interpretation of these results seems to be that policing may respond to
local budgetary constraints to a greater degree than crime itself.
It is also important to note that the use of “budgetary capacities” may not be an accurate
reflection of a city’s ability to provide funding for certain public services. Pressures from local
constituents and other outside influences may prompt police departments and budgeters to find
funds for certain uses, whether that be from local, federal, or private sources. Local pressure to
fund body cameras for police officers is a noteworthy example of this, in addition to other
technologies that are costly to provide for a police department. In response to this pressure,
police departments are needing to “find” the money even when their budgets don’t allow for
these purchases. For example, in 2014 the L.A. Police Department announced that it would be
purchasing 7,000 body cameras for its officers. At the time, local budget constraints wouldn’t
allow for this amount of increased spending, and the money for the cameras needed to be funded
privately through donations (L.A. Times, 2014). Thus, even without growth in revenues, a city
may be pressured into funding police to a higher degree because of community concerns, as is
happening recently related to police brutality and lack of transparency. If budgeters are forced to
“find” these funds, this may come at the cost of scaling back allocations to other areas of public
services like education or health spending. Thus, a city’s ability to provide police services
certainly does depend on the amount of available funding, but there are likely other factors that
have been generalized within the definition of “budgetary capacities” that are deserving of this
caveat.
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Also, with more police and less violent/property crime, police have turned to making
drug arrests, which are up close to 50% since the early 90’s (JPI, 2012). It may be difficult to
assess whether drug use in large cities has increased at the same rate as drug arrests, as arrests for
drug use may not be an appropriate measure of actual drug use, since police may be arresting
drug offenders that have essentially “slipped through the cracks” when more focus was placed on
combatting violent crimes in the 80’s and 90’s.
Future extensions of research regarding police spending in the next decade would
complement this study well. It would be worthwhile to explore how police expenditures are
responding to other types of crime, like cyber-crimes. With technology playing such an integral
role in today’s society, the potential for these crimes has only increased, and the potential for
police to change their focus towards combatting such crimes is a likely possibility. Furthermore,
future studies would benefit by incorporating different measures of influence that local
constituents may have on the budget process, in addition to local perceptions regarding fear of
crime, and other social or community pressures that may influence levels of police spending.
Measures of such variables likely have some effect on how revenues are allocated, but are
inherently difficult to measure with accuracy, hence their lack of availability. These potential
omitted factors are, in theory, controlled for in the model, as a result of fixed-effects estimation,
but the model suffers from a lack of ability to separate out each of these omitted effects, and the
effects are assumed to be time-invariant. With shorter time-series lengths, as is the case in this
analysis, this assumption is likely more valid, as it may take longer for social perceptions and/or
expectations to change drastically within a community. While substantial changes in these
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unobserved characteristics may have taken place over the course of eight years, on the whole it is
likely that many have stayed the same.
If police spending in large city governments were to be scaled back in the future, there is
potential to see positive impact on other areas of public discourse like health and education
spending, and improvements in such areas may provide greater benefits to the community than
an increased police presence, the benefits of which may even come in the form of further
reductions in local crime. In a time where local police forces - especially in large cities - have
become more militarized, growing distrust between citizens and their police forces has caused
increased tensions, especially in communities of color where social justice movements and other
forms of activism are more prevalent.
The jury is still out on what specifically causes changes in police spending, as multiple
studies, including this one, have produced conflicting results. Much more research regarding
determinants of crime and police expenditures needs to be done before we can conclusively
define their relationship, and only then can strategies and local policies be implemented to
efficiently and effectively serve the needs of local communities to the greatest effect.
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